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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
WHAT IS WILLFUL MISCONDUCT" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACT IN MISSOURI?
Under the compensation law of Missouri, the employee be-
comes entitled to an allowance, irrespective of negligence or miscon-
duct on his part, if the injury was sustained while he was engaged
in his work. The only defense left to an employer is that the injury
was sustained outside of the employment. Such a law is of course
enacted not only for the purpose of insuring compensation for an
injured employee by distributing the hazard amongst the many, but
is also intended to check litigation.
The only section' of Missouri's act which opens a door for litiga-
tion is the following:
"Nor shall compensation be allowed for an injury or death due
to the employee's or another's willful misconduct, including intentional
self-inflicted injury, intoxication, and willful failure or refusal to use
a safety appliance or perform a duty required by law or failure to
obey any reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the safety of the
employee, as to all of which the burden of proof shall rest upon the
employer."
But tvhat constitutes ",illful misconduct" waithin the meaning of
the foregoing clause? Although the compensation laws are new in
the United States and England, we are not without numerous defini-
tions of the phrase 'willful misconduct," nor do we lack cases de-
cided by the highest courts of England and by the thirty-odd states
in this country which have adopted Compensation Laws in recent
years. Indeed, many distinctive features of the American statutes
are taken literally from the English Act or are closely modeled thereon.
Especially is this true of the so-called "willful misconduct" clauses.
Under the English act,1 it is provided that "if it is proved that the
injury to the workman is attributable to the willful misconduct of that
workman, any claim in respect of that injury shall be disallowed."
The Massachusetts Act of 1911 provides that "if the employee
is injured by reason of his serious and willful misconduct he shall not
receive compensation."
1. Section 3. Last sentence.
2. 6 Edw. 7c. 58.
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In fact, an examination of the compensation laws of the various
states, including New York, Wisconsin, California, Ohio and Illinois,
contain some provision on the subject of willful misconduct closely
modeled after the English Act and very similar, if not the same, as
the Missouri Act. Since there is a rather expressed uniformity in such
provisions, a review of the decisions of these states will give us an
idea of what our courts will say about the "willful misconduct" clause.
In construing the meaning of willfid misconduct, the following
questions will naturally arise: What does the word "wiflful" mean
in its application to the Workmen's Compensation Laws? What is
uLliful misconduct as opposed to contributory negligence! Does the
failure on the part of the workman to use the proper safety appliance
necessarily make the act willful as contemplated by the exception under
consideration?
I.
What is meant by the word "willful"? According to Bums case
(Mass.$), the phrase "involves conduct of a quasi-criminal nature, the
intentional doing of something, either with the knowledge that it is
likely to result in serious injury, or with the wanton and reckless dis-
regard of its probable consequences." In a famous English Court
of Appeals case, George v. Glasgow Coal Co.,' the court in construing
the meaning of willful misconduct used the following language:
"When an act is momentary and inadvertent, not deliberate, it cannot
be said to be willful; willful misconduct must be willfulness in wrong-
doing, knouing the quality of the act." Again, it was held, in United
States v. Edwards,* "that the phrase willful misconduct means a
violation of law, knowingly and deliberately committed."
But it is not necessary to go to other states and jurisdictions for
the meaning of the expression "willful misconduct." The term, prior
to the enactment of the compensation law, seems to hove acquired a
rather fixed meaning in Missouri, although, of course, not used or
construed with reference to any workmen's compensation law. The
Supreme Court' of this state has adopted the following as the defini-
tion of willfulness:
Willfulness, a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just
cause."
This meaning, which is fundamentally the same as is found in the
3. 218 Mass. 158.
4. George v. Glasgow Coal Co. App. cas. 190 (Eng. 123).
5. Peck v. Taubamm, 251 Mo. loc. cit. 423. See also Schmacher Distil-
lery Case, 170 Mo. App. 361.
6. 43 Fed. 67 (C. C.)
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Burns case, and in George v. Glasgow, supra; excludes any degree
of negligence and includes only wanton and intentional acts-those
in which there is "intent, actual or constructive." Therefore, since it
is reasonable to assume that the legislature had in view the Supreme
Court's definition when they drew up the Compensation Act, and since
the construction of the word in compensation cases is fundamentally
the same as definition of our Supreme Court, it can be concluded that
there must be a "mens rea' condition of the mind bordering on crimi-
nality in refusing compensation.
II.
It has been pointed out in a previous paragraph that, notwith-
standing contributory negligence of the employee, compensation will
be allowed for injuries, except in the cases of willful misconduct. The
question which then arises is: In what respect does willful miscon-
duct differ from contributory negligence? What is the border line be-
tween the two? If the abstract definition of the words "willful mis-
conduct" as construed by the courts of the state is kept in mind, the
differentiation is not very difficult. Neither carelessness, amounting
to gross negligence, nor evidence of mistake can amount to oillfu!
misconduct. The facts of the case must point to a deliberate act, or
failure to act, or intoxication operating as the proximate cause of the
injury.
The Arbitration loard of Michigan' discussed the point of 'will-
ful misconduct- and -contributory negligence" within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act upon the following facts: Deceased
was working as a carpenter on the roof of a building being constructed
by the defendant. Since the weather was cold, the foreman called to
the deceased to come down for some hot coffee, it being the custom
to serve the men with hot coffee in cold weather. Deceased, instead
of descending by the usual extension ladder, used a rope, and in some
manner lost his hold and was killed. In ruling upon the points raised
by the defendant that the injury was not one arising out of. and in the
course of employment, and that it was the result of the workman's
intentional and willful misconduct, the board said:
"Mere negligence, or even gross negligence, will not defeat com-
pensation. If the deceased's plans had carried, he would have had
only a drop of five or six feet. There is scarcely a healthy boy today
who does not take a greater chance and without harm. For a man
accustomed to physical toil, it cannot be said that such an act should
be characterized as willful misconduct."
7. Clem. v. Chalmers Motor Co., 178 Mich. 340.
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Another decision directly in point is a case of the Indiana Court
of Appeals.' The evidence in this case tended to show that it was
customary for the workmen of a plant to quit actual work fifteen min-
utes before going off duty for the purpose of washing their hands.
Usually, in order to heat water, they heated a bar of iron and dropped
it into a pail of water. All this was done with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the employer. On the day of the accident, the fires in
the furnaces had gone out, and heating water by the usual method
could not be accomplished. Applicant, when preparing to leave the
plant, went into an adjoining room and there saw a tank filled with
hot liquid which had the appearance of water. This liquid, however,
was an explosive acid. Applicant, thinking it to be water, placed a
pail of cold water therein for the purpose of heating it. An explosion
followed and applicant was seriously burned about the face and arms.
Clearly, the point to be decided in this case was whether the appli-
cant was guilty of "willful misconduct." The custom of washing was
acquiesced in by the employer. He had provided no other means of
washing. True, the evidence of mistake points to gross negligence,
but the gross negligence in this case has not the slightest tone of inten-
tional wrongdoing. To say that mere negligence is willful miscon-
duct would mean to maintain the very rules the law intends to abro-
gate. The injured workman recovered compensation because the
employer failed to prove willful misconduct from the facts.
However, it would be considered "willful misconduct" in a case*
where a proposed operation for a cataract on the eye of an employee
would not be attended with any risk, and appeared to be such an opera-
tion as any reasonable man would take advantage of, if he had no one
against whom he could claim compensation. It is the duty of such
employee to have the operation performed, and upon unreasonable
refusal the continued loss of sight would be attributed to his refusal
and not to the accident. Of course, if it is the case of a foreigner
who does not understand instructions, or the result of the operation
is problematical, it is not a bar to compensation in the event of refusal
to undergo operation. In short, the employee must try to avoid un-
reasonable aggravation of the injury.
Again, in the cases of obvious dangers, where, let us say, a miner
was injured in crossing a shaft which was regarded as notoriousiv
dangerous, although there was no rule prohibiting miners from cross-
ing it, such an action would be "willful misconduct." The intentional
8. Ind. App. Cas. N. E. 386 (1918).
9. Supreme Court of Illinois. Joliet Motor Co. v. Ind. Board Ills.,
280 Ills. 148.
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doing of something with reckless disregard of the known and probable
consequences is manifested here."M
In addition, intoxication, when it occasions injury, amounts to
.'willful misconduct": for under the express terms of Missouri's act,
injury or death due to intoxication is willful misconduct. The real
test in such a case is to prove whether or not the workman was actually
intoxicated. Such a discussion is beside our question.
In view of the above decisions, we find that uil1ful misconduct
is distinct from contributory neyligence. The willful misconduct clause
contemplates an intentional and willful act, or failure to act, on the
part of the employee. who knous the consequences of his act at the
line he does it, or the consequences of his failure to act, and intends
and suills that the result shall followz. Gross uegligencc may be found
to be a-fact where willful misconduct does not exist, and so the em-
ployee receives compensation.
III.
Is a workman guilty, as a matter of law, of willful misconduct
because he has violated rules and orders laid down by the master for
the protection of the servant? True, according to the words of the
willful misconduct clause in the new act, "failure or refusal to use a
safety appliance, or failure to obey any reasonable regulation adopted
by the employer for the safety of the employee, shall be deemed willful
misconduct." But suppose the rule was so poorly enforced that it
was unknown to the employee, shall a violation of that rule be deemed
willful nisconduct? Our attention is called to the following case:"
Applicant worked as a hand hammerer for the defendant. There was
a danger that chips flying about would injure the eyes of the work-
men. Defendant on a given day purchased goggles and posted a small
notice near the tool clerk's window, stating that the goggles were
available and requiring their use by the hammerers, and further stat-
ing that injuries through failure to use them would be at the em-
ployee's risk. The foreman testified that he had attempted to bring
the notice on paper slips to the attention of the employees, but it
appeared that his efforts were directed chiefly, if not solely, to the
machine workers, and that the hand workers had been permitted to
continue work without goggles. Applicant testified that he had never
seen nor heard of this notice or rule, and that he had been employed
in other shipbuilding yards, and there had never been a practice of
requiring workmen to wear goggles. In the course of his opinion, the
judge in this case said:
10. Leishman v. Dixon Co. (1910) 47 Scotch L. R. 410.
11. McClelland v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., Mass. W. C. C. 122.
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"It seems clear that there had been no real effort to enforce this
rule. If a rule is unknown to an employee, can the violation of that
rule be willful misconduct? There is no element of intentional wrong-
doing present, or a willful disobedience of a regulation."
Nor can the infraction of a rule, habitually violated by the em-
ploye, be said to be willful misconduct. The judge in Casey v. Hum-
phries12 found that a girl fourteen years old employed as a soda bottler
was not guilty of willful misconduct in neglecting to wear gauntlets
which had been furnished by the employer, and which by the special
rules of the establishment and by special orders given directly to the
workmen she was required to use, where the evidence showed that the
forelady had allowed her to disregard the rule, but verbally told her
to put them on "when the boss was around.-
In further support of the proposition that the violation of rules
for the safety of the employee does not, as a matter of law. render the
employee guilty of willful misconduct, we quote from Deistelhorst v.
Ind. Acc. Bd. Cal." In this case a minor was engaged as a helper
around a gold dredge. He had been instructed by his employer on
two occasions not to oil the machinery while it was in motion, and had
been warned frequently of the danger in so doing. At the time of
the injury, the power had been shut off, but the machine was running
on its own momentum. For the purpose of saving time, and without
at the time being mindful of the orders and warnings, the employee
attempted to oil the machinery and was injured. It was contended
by the employer on a petition to annul the award in favor of the
injured employee that the latter's violation of instructions amounted
to willful misconduct. In affirming the award the court said:
"The violation of a rule known to the party would of course raise
the presumption that it was done deliberately and intentionally, but
it is a disputable presumption. May not a person, although guilty of
the infraction of an order for his benefit, show that at the time he was
unmindful of the order and that his act was the result of inattention
and thoughtlessness? When a person violates a known rule, it should
be held ordinarily that he does it deliberately, but we do not think
that the door should be closed entirely against such injuries, at least
in the case of a mere child. \Ve hold that the voluntary failure on the
part of the workman to use a proper safety appliance does not neces-
sarily make the act willful as contemplated by the exception under
consideration.
But a workman is guilty of willful misconduct where he delib-
12. 6 W. C. C. 520 (Eng.).
13. Deistelhorst v. Ord Ace. Com. Cal., 32 Cal. App. 771.
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erately violates a rule with the knowledge at the time of the violation.
Where a company" had issued a rule forbidding the driver or fireman
to leave the running board while the engine was in motion, and an
engine driver had climbed back on the tender to get a better quality of
coal for the purpose of making up lost time, and was killed by being
hit by a bridge over the track, the court held that the violation of this
rule was willful misconduct as precluded the dependants of the driver
from recovering compensation. Here the workman did a dangerous
act, knowingly, and contrary to the expressed orders of the company.
So it was held in the case of the Great Western Power Co. v. Pills-
bury,1" that the failure to use rubber gloves while working with "live
wires." as the rule of the employer required, was willful misconduct,
which was a bar to the recovery of compensation. Still another illus-
tration of the willful failure to use the proper safety appliance is
found in the case of the Bayshore Laundry Co. v. Ind. B. Cal." Appli-
cant while operating a wringing machine in the defendant's laundry,
removed a guard, and by reason of such removal, his hand and arm
were caught in the machine. The facts show that if he had not re-
moved the guard, the injury would not have happened. According to
the testimony of the applicant, he performed the act for the definite
purpose of gaining time. Is this not evidence that his act was inten-
tional, deliberate, and willful? He was an experienced laundryman,
and understood the meclhanism of the machine perfectly. He knew
that the guard was provided for his protection and to prevent acci-
dents. There is no doubt that his act constituted willful onisconduct.
A review of the cases cited convinces us that the whole section
under consideration resolves itself into a question of whether or not
the employee, according to the facts of the case, is guilty of uillful
,insconduct. The mere violation of an order will not of itself defeat
compensation, unless it can be shown that the injured employee was
guilty of willful misconduct. The willful misconduct clause, to repeat
a previous statement, contemplates an intentional and w4iful act, or
failure to act, on the part of the employee, who knows the conse-
quences of his act at the time he does it, or the consequences of his
failure to act, and intends and wills that the result shall follow.
ERWIN E. STEINBERG.
14. Bist v. London & Southwestern Ry. Co. (1907) 9 W. C. C. 19.
15. Great Western Power Co. v. Pillbury. 149 Pacific Reporter 35.
16. Bay Shore Laundry Co. v. Ind. B. 172 Pac. 1128 (1918).
Washington University Open Scholarship
